

A retrospective look at the Balkan wars of 1912-1913

Dr. Edit Bregu

Vice Dean, University College Wisdom, Albania

Prof. Asoc. Dr. Naim Mëçalla

Vice Rector, Dean, University College Wisdom, Albania

Abstract

At the end of the two “serials” of the Balkan wars (1912-1913) it is natural to make an observation and, at the same time, an analytical assessment of them. The analyzes are multifaceted, multifaceted, political, diplomatic, socio-economic, military, moral-psychological, demographic, territorial and border, etc. Of course, the historical arguments of these peoples have different explanations, and each Balkan nation reserves for them its own truth, which is both magnificent and disturbing when it is sought to be imposed among others. It turns out that whenever the political seasons in the Balkans change, it is imperative that this issue be reopened and reconsidered carefully. In this paper I will try to analyze and shed light on the human and financial costs of the Balkan Wars and their reasons and causes.

Keywords: war, Balkans, nationalism, population, military forces, etc.

Methodology

Through this paper, I managed to use a qualitative research methodology, with primary and secondary data which are the result of reviewing a fairly extensive contemporary and archival literature regarding to the purpose of the study that this topic will follow to the researchers. The implementation and realization of the goals and objective, this study tries to achieve through the implementation of a scientific Methodology where the base is in-depth research and comparison, and analysis through the facts arising from archival sources in the historic area, documentary collections, as and utilization of assets, documentary material and published domestic and foreign historical literature.

Introduction

At the end of the two “serials” of the Balkan wars (1912-1913) it is natural to make an observation and, at the same time, an analytical assessment of them. The analyzes are multifaceted, multifaceted, political, diplomatic, socio-economic, military, moral-psychological, demographic, territorial and border, etc. It is therefore easy to see that the Balkan wars turned out to be decisive stages in the general deterioration of political, economic and social life in the Balkan region and, consequently, in Europe between 1908 and 1914. According to the great writer L. Tolstoy, peace is the other calm and beautiful shore, in the face of noisy and frightening destructive war, both on the banks of the rushing river of life events (Tolstoy, 2003). Of course, the historical

arguments of these peoples have different explanations, and each Balkan nation reserves for them its own truth, which is both magnificent and disturbing when it is sought to be imposed among others. It turns out that whenever the political seasons in the Balkans change, it is imperative that this issue be reopened and reconsidered carefully. In the same vein, the Balkan resettlement of 1913 represents important figures to consider. First, significant differences are observed in terms of territorial expansion, which are illustrated and validated through the following data. Romania, which was involved in the Second Balkan War, also gained about 7,100 square kilometers (Bregu 2016). On the other hand, Albania already had an area of only 29,000 km², while European Turkey was reduced by 84 percent compared to 1912. The second view is related to the demographic growth, which occurred as a result of the expansion of the territory of the Balkan states. According to data from the Cornegie Commission, the population of Serbia experienced a markedly growing hop, it went from 2,900,000 to about 4,500,000 inhabitants; the population of Greece increased from 2,670,000 to about 4,300,000; the population of Bulgaria from 4,340,000 went to about 4,800,000; while the population of Montenegro from 285,000 went to about 500,000 (Bregu 2016). These figures, which are approximate, help to create an idea of the expansion of territories and, consequently, the demographic changes in the Balkan region before and after the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. In all this evolution, of course, those who would pay would be the common people who, suddenly found themselves involved in the territory of another nation and state! At this point the 150,000 inhabitants of the ethnically Romanian Dobruja were almost all Bulgarians, with some Tartar and Turkish communities and a few Romanians. According to historian and demographer Justin McCarthy, the territory finally given to Greece in 1911 had a population of 1.7 million, and among them only 797,000, or 45 percent of the total population, were Greeks (Bregu 2016). Meanwhile, Muslims numbered 746,000, including many Albanians from southern Chameria and Turks from western Thrace. The territories conquered by Bulgaria, always in 1911, had a population of 581,000, of whom 204,000 were Bulgarians and 327,000 Muslims, divided into Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks), Turks of the Eastern Rhodopes, and Turks of Western Thrace (Bregu 2016). The biggest disproportion belongs to Serbia's benefits. It had expanded to a territory where, in 1911, there were 2,300,000 inhabitants, of whom 1,200,000 were Muslims, with a pure Albanian majority, about one million Macedonian Slavs, and probably 100,000 inhabitants were Serbs scattered in Sandzak, Kosovo and Northern Macedonia (Bregu 2016). These calculations, roughly, give an idea of what had happened to the innocent population, which very quickly fell prey to assimilation, genocide and mass deportations. For these reasons, the question arises what human and financial costs did the Balkan Wars have? With all the rope of hope thrown at it by the Great Powers of the time, Turkey left Europe or, figuratively speaking, no longer had the status of one of the major European powers.

Body of paper

The Balkan wars were bloody and costly. During the ten weeks of fighting, the six weeks of the First Balkan War and the four weeks of the Second Balkan War, some

200,000 fighters (Glenny, 2007) were killed, not counting civilians, and in addition to tens of thousands of victims of cholera, typhoid and dysentery. No one can ever learn again about the thousands of men, women and children who died of starvation, disease and massacre, writes J. Skurman. Meanwhile, different studies give equally different figures for those killed in the two Balkan Wars. If we refer to the researcher Richard Hall who, in a recent study of his, summarizes figures from more sources and studies, then we have an overview of the losses in both wars. According to him, during the First Balkan War alone, Bulgaria had 14,000 killed, 19,000 killed by epidemics and 50,000 wounded; Greece for its part left 5169 killed and 23,500 wounded. Serbia suffered at least 20,000 killed and killed in fighting and epidemics, while at least 10,000 others were injured; Montenegro suffered 2,800 dead and 6,600 injured. In the end, the war alone left 60,000 dead and at least 100,000 wounded among the Allies (Bregu 2016). While the Second Balkan War cost Bulgaria 18,000 killed, 15,000 killed by epidemics and 60,000 wounded; Greece 2,500 dead and 19,300 wounded; Serbia 9,000 dead, 5,000 others killed by epidemics and 36,000 injured; while Montenegro 240 dead and 900 injured. In all, the Balkan states had suffered about 50,000 deaths and nearly 116,000 injuries (Bregu 2016). If we summarize here the losses of the Ottoman Empire, it can be said that the human cost was about 220,000 dead and about 360,000 wounded, about one dead (killed) in every six soldiers recruited and almost three in every ten soldiers wounded. The total number of casualties in the two Balkan Wars, with 200,000 fighters killed, not counting civilians, including tens of thousands of victims of cholera, typhoid and dysentery, is also confirmed by another well-known Balkan history researcher, Mischa Glén (Glenny, 2007). Another well-known scholar of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, which we have quoted before, gives these figures on human losses during these wars. His statements refer to the comparison of official data of the Carnegie Foundation, Edward J. Erickson and Alexander Vachkov. But, these data are disputed, partly by other sources, mainly Albanian. One of these sources is the History of the Albanian Army, which brings the losses of the Montenegrin army in the fight for the capture of Shkodra to 12,000 people, while those of the Serbian side to 4,000 people (*History of the Albanian Army 1912-1939, Part one, 2000*). Another Albanian source, the book of the author Përparim Rexhepi dedicated to the Shkodra war of 1912-1913, a book based on many archival documents, as well as other published sources Turkish, Italian, Serbian, Albanian, etc., brings the number of losses of the Montenegrin military forces, in 16-18 (Rexhepi, 2001), thousand killed and wounded. However, it is quite difficult to provide data on civilians killed due to frequent population movements, forced evictions or emigration. Regarding these losses, the correspondent of a Czech newspaper, E. Skatula, present during these battles, would write with a creepy, but very expressive and realistic language their horrors: *"Only Dante's pen can accurately describe the path coming from Lozengrad, only his mysterious talent would be able to recreate all the horrors of the icy swamps, on the lines and sludge of which rise the mutilated and torn bodies of the fallen. The article goes on with many detailed and highly realistic descriptions of the piles of people killed and slaughtered, the dead animals and the numerous destructions* (Scatula, 1913). On the other hand, the financial capital invested in the service of the war was quite large. Almost all the Balkan states poured in and invested their main resources in it, because

they all started with the hope and confidence to win this war. However, it is difficult to give figures for the financial costs of the two wars because all the Alliance states “inflate” the costs a little, to seek greater compensation when they are completed and peace is established with the Ottoman Empire. In the years that followed 1815, peace was constantly and continually threatened by the social and economic changes that forged the pages of world history. Undoubtedly, the main role in these events was played by diplomats. They are the ones who, with their minds and determination, have always given life to the policies, fates and roles of the states they have represented. The Balkan states, both individually and collectively, constitute a good subject from historical experience for the comparative study of the political and economic problems faced by, in general, multiethnic societies. Although the strategies used by the political elites of these countries have not always been successful and benevolent, especially towards Albanians, again the analysis of problems and strategies, in itself, is valuable for scholars and analysts and perhaps even for statesmen interested in understanding and appropriate issues from other societies. And perhaps Taleyrans cynical observation about human experience, who wrote, “The more things change, the more the same story repeats itself, will be confirmed!” The Balkan events of 1912-1913 took place on the outskirts of Europe immersed in a late, positivist and colonialist “*belle époque*” that, after four decades of peace, had forgotten what the reality of a real crisis was. This was, as one author wrote: “*Against the exotic backdrop of a disintegrating empire, military and diplomatic maneuvers, venues, and protagonists of a coral event seemed like a subject for a fiction that was closer to Western sensibility than the wars of remote against Chinese boxers or boers* (Ivetic, 2008). The Balkans had gained a growing interest during the 19th century. News of the uprisings and their repression had filled the pages of all European newspapers. The object of the travel memoirs, the analyzes, of so many stale conversations of the imaginary Western conformist, the peoples and, subsequently, the Balkan states represented, especially from 1875 until the First World War, the “Third European World”, economically and socially backward, mired in the endless eastern crisis, enslaved to imperial politics, ready to start wars. The Balkan wars have been regarded by many scholars as warning signs of the Great War, as World War I was commonly called, and thousands of books have been written about them and extensive studies in the field of diplomacy have been conducted in many languages of the world. It should also be noted that military operations conducted during these wars have found a very prominent place in the treatment, being taken as an important object for studies in the history of military science. The size and duration of Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek military operations, rapid maneuvers, troop deployment, first trench warfare experiences, unprecedented combat operations against fortified regions, use of the railway network, naval blockades, etc., showed a strategic maturity and advanced raid and attack techniques, obtained from the most developed western military schools. For the then Balkan states, as well as for contemporary Serbian, Montenegrin, Bulgarian and Greek cultures and authors, the First Balkan War was a liberation war by centuries-old Ottoman invaders and at the same time liberation from their rule, which had sown a complete backwardness. In this way, the only way to close the five hundred year accounts with the Ottoman Empire was to capture and own the territorial territories

that had still remained under Ottoman rule. These lands and populations became the triumph of victory over the Ottomans, as the “promised land”, seeing them as the ultimate solution to all problems. But, in this way they did nothing but sow the seeds of destruction and backwardness for their peoples and the surrounding neighbors. The end of the Balkan wars led to some very important conclusions, not only for the time in which they took place, but at the same time they provided a very interesting picture of their main characteristics, a model to be observed as an object of study. For the first time in more than five centuries, conditions of equilibrium, stability and stability seem to have been realized in the region. Meanwhile, the Treaty of St. Stephen greatly expanded Russia’s influence in the Balkans, a development which was no longer welcomed by the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This influence allowed Russia to dominate the Balkans and reach the shores of the Black Sea, which was unacceptable to both Austria-Hungary and Britain. Hence the convening of the Berlin Congress, which was seen as a necessary event to establish balances not only between Russia and Austria-Hungary, but in the whole region, for the whole sphere of interests. It was no coincidence that it was decided that the convention should be held in Berlin. This city was regarded as a symbol of development, as within a short time, it was transformed from an ordinary city into a center of German and European economy run by a great leader, such as Otto von Bismarck, one of the men of the greatest state of his time. Seen in the light of that time, Berlin’s selection for the development of Congress was, in a way, forced by the circumstances of the time, which saw Berlin and Germany as an absolute power of development. Bismarck’s assessment was based on a policy of “strong interests”. His *realpolitik* relied on the ability to use real force. This assessment ignored and disregarded both the empires that were being destroyed and crumbling, as well as the small countries that were emerging. According to him, if the countries were not able to gather and maintain large armies, their opinion was worthless. Under Bismarck, the Berlin Congress obeyed all the demands of the Balkan states and served the three spheres of growing interest - the Austro-Hungarian, the Russian and the British (Hall, 2000). In foreign policy Bismarck’s main goal was to maintain such a balance of power as to thwart any possible anti-German alliance. As long as Berlin, Vienna and St. Petersburg adhered to some kind of agreement, even if they did not reach a concrete military alliance, France and Britain would be incapable of harming German interests. In fact, as the Ottomans withdrew from centuries-old possessions, claims to take their place increased day by day. As the historian Misha Glenny estimates, *the repeated demands and counter-demands of the new Balkan states further aggravated the situation, making the lines where Russia and Austria-Hungary intersected extremely broken and dangerous. “From now on, more or less confusing quarrels between the countries of Southeast Europe could quickly escalate into a very large conflict between the Great Powers, which supported one country or the other”* (Glenny, 2007). In fact, as mentioned in this study, divisions, claims and divisions in the Balkans have very early roots. Greater Bulgaria, Greater Serbia, Greater Romania, or even the Greek Megali-Idheja, were deeply rooted in the Balkan nations and policymakers, thus inciting an aggressive nationalism, beyond normal, which resulted in genocide and conflicts that would persecute the Balkans even beyond modern times. In addition, the claims on Macedonia, Epirus, Albania,

Kosovo, inspired by the infamous Serbian and Greek plans such as “Nachertania” or “Megali-Idheja”, were seen as the way to modernize the Balkan states to get closer to the great western states. !!! First in the philosophical sense of state history we have clashes of two different systems, of modern and nationalist nation-states, on the one hand, and of multi-ethnic European Turkey, malformed and with extremely difficult social and economic conditions, which resulted in too much backward for the time, on the other hand. History showed that the first system was the one that emerged victorious and, the second, was ultimately ruined. But, what was the price to be paid?! As is already known, the First Balkan War was crowned with the signing on May 30, 1913 of the Peace Treaty in London, according to which Turkey was deprived of almost all its possessions in Europe, except for a narrow belt around Constantinople, as well as renounced all claims to Crete. The final settlement of the Albanians and the Aegean islands, most of them occupied by Greece during the war, was left to a later decision of the Great Powers. However, long before the Treaty of London it was clear that peace with Turkey would not bring peace to the Balkans and it was certain that new crises would develop there. And in fact that is what happened. The Second Balkan War of June 29 - August 10, 1913, took place between Bulgaria on the one hand and Serbia, Greece, Romania, Montenegro and Turkey on the other (Hall, 2000). It was caused by the great aggravation of the contradictions between the former allies of the First Balkan War. For its part, Serbia, which had no access to the Adriatic Sea, demanded compensation in Macedonia. Regarding this old dream, at first Serbia’s main interest was to secure a cruise. In November of the same year, Prime Minister Pasic told the Times: *The main issue is for Serbia to have 50km of coastline from Lezha to Durres. “This coast will join Old Serbia”, - in other words, Serbia would extend from Kosovo, including most of northern Albania, to the sea* (Malcolm, 2001). Greece also claimed to have expanded at the expense of Bulgaria, which took over most of the lands regained by war. Romania declared its claims to Dobruja to Bulgaria. Many studies have argued that the problem that sparked the outbreak of World War II was Bulgaria’s disappointment in the process of dividing the spoils of war. However, as a result of the Second Balkan War, a new distribution of forces took place on the peninsula. Romania seceded from the Allied Troika formed in 1882 and became closer to the Entente, while Bulgaria joined the Austro-German bloc.

Conclusions

These wars changed the lines of influence and claims not only between the Balkan peoples, but also between the Great Powers themselves, thus serving as a “catalyst” that sparked one of the two greatest conflicts human history has ever seen. Regarding this historical assessment, several opinions have actually prevailed. Some think that the Balkan Wars, with the new division of possessions and sphere of interests, was simply one of some of the causes that caused the outbreak of the First World War. Meanwhile, the rest of the scholars think that the First World War happened exactly from the Balkans, this peninsula with its own events, was the detonator of the Great War.

Personally, I think a little differently, for the very fact that, even after the two world

wars, the Balkans followed with constant conflicts, remaining a very delicate problem for world politics. For these reasons, the Balkan Peninsula has demanded special attention and continues to seek it currently due to some unresolved issues. Therefore, I would agree with the second group of Balkan scholars. But the well-known scholar of Balkan history, M. Teodorova, has a somewhat different opinion as she writes: *Although, at least technically, it is indisputable that the spark for the gunpowder barrel for the First World War came from the Balkans, very rarely "They are the historians who would claim that there was a cause* (Teodorova, 2004). Thus, as this researcher tells us, there have been and probably continue to be clashes between various studies regarding the role and importance they had for the start of the First World War, the Balkan Wars. However, it is worth noting that the Balkan Wars were fierce wars, with a large negative material and financial balance but, above all, in human losses. As a result of claims often absurd and based on historical pseudo-arguments, the leaders of the Balkan peoples sowed with infancy and immaturity the policies they promoted in their own populations, feelings of deep and long hatred and contempt for the "nearby" neighbor. The report of the Cornegie Foundation, dated 1913, states that: *The common feature of the Balkan wars is that... the war is not only between the armies, but between the nations themselves... That's why these wars are so fierce, they end up losing more people, and ending up with the extinction of the population and the destruction of entire areas.* " The purpose of the armed conflict, the report continues, *was the complete disappearance of a foreign population. "Villages were destroyed, women of 'enemy' national identity were raped and often killed, captives were killed, or locked up in old buildings where they died of starvation or cold, great cruelty was shown to the defeated, and so on* (Other Balcan Wars, 1993). *This went beyond the measure of mere disregard for entering the realm of deliberate and abominable atrocities, wrote G. Kennan* (Other Balcan Wars, 1993). It has often served as the golden mean of the battle where the interests of the Great Powers and their neighbors have clashed, who have always been open-eyed towards Albania to annex any part of its territory. In the context of the efforts of the Serbs that they made on a national scale to increase the numbers, as they were interested, in the statistics for the ethnographic aspect, they, since nothing matched, started a systematic extermination of the Muslim population, which meant Albanian. It was in connection with these exterminations that some radical members of the Serbian Social Democratic Party reacted at the time, especially Dimitri Tucovi,, who protested against this Serbian policy (Cana, 1984). Meanwhile, the Austrian Social Democrat, Leo Freundlih, collected facts about Serbian barbarism and published them in 1913, in a book entitled: *"Albaniens Golgotha" (Albanian Golgotha)*, (Cana, 1984). Another author, Noel Malcolm, testifies about the report of the Cornegie Commission (Carnegie) regarding these massacres among Albanians, who in his book *"Kosovo a short history"*, has removed some lines from the pages of the report. Although he did not have the courage to announce the total number of Albanians killed, the report concluded that in fact, a systematic persecution of Albanians had taken place: *"Whole houses and villages had been reduced to ashes, innocent people had been massacred and unarmed... Such were the tools that were used and are still being used by the Serbo-Montenegrin army in order to radically change the ethnic structure of the regions inhabited exclusively by Albanians* (Malcolm, 2001). So the goal was twofold! The

massacres, the incredible acts of violence, especially against the Albanians are extremely macabre. It suffices to refer to a letter of a Serbian soldier in the Serbian newspaper "Radnikiki Novine" on October 9 and 22, 1912: *Among other things, he is surprised and writes how can a person do such atrocities... I am just saying that "Luma (an Albanian province along the river of the same name) no longer exists, there is nothing but corpses, there are villages with 100, 150, 200 houses, where there is no man left, in the full sense of the word none. We gather people in groups of forty to fifty people and then kill them all by piercing them with bayonets* (Other Balcan Wars, 1993). What is worse is that historians have often been instrumental in these chauvinist claims, giving us a vague and biased view of the reflection of historical facts and events. However, no one can deny the fact that the Albanian people with its tradition and history, from the most ancient ancestors Pelasgians and until today, has been an important factor in the troubled Balkan Peninsula. Even the statement, according to which the Balkans is considered a "gunpowder barrel" that can explode at any moment, we can respond with the fact that Albanians have always been a source of stability, cooperation and peace in the region, beyond the injustices done by some of Balkan neighbors with the approval of the Great Powers. The latter even justified the injustice they did to the Albanians regarding the borders by saying that, ostensibly, with the partition of Albania, they had done honor to the "altar of European peace". But time would tell that through the realization of narrow interests of profit as in the case of the former Yugoslavia, they had set fire to the "wick", which would explode with the World Wars and continue until postmodern times. And it would be again these powers, along with the US, that would pay the costs. In a way, we can say that the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 sealed and confirmed the fall of the Ottoman Empire, but they had very little effect on creating a positive basis for a new modern state system in Southeast Europe. Despite their great claims, the new Balkan states were still very fragile, small, with insecure policies, surrounded by the nightmares of the past and hatred, as well as the shadows of the great visions of resurrected empires! They were all tortured by national designs, failed within the borders of a single state, inspired by an ideology of integrative nationalism. Also, all these states were dependent on the sponsorships of the Great Powers, which facilitated the path to the realization of their national objectives. You can easily see the similarity between the events of these wars and those that took place in the Last Wars in the Balkans during the nineties of the twentieth century, especially with the one that took place in Kosovo. It is clear that even when crimes were committed by armed gangs, they were carried out under the noses of military commanders and were often commanded by them. Also, there is no doubt that religion played an equally important role, both in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and in the wars that took place in the Balkans of modern times, adding hostilities as a motive for war. However, according to the report of the Cornegie Commission, and even of many other studies, even later, it would be wrong to call this motivation the main cause. According to analyzes made by some of them, the Turks, even at the height of their authority in the Balkans, have been relatively tolerant in their treatment of non-Muslim religious institutions. Consequently one of the most important factors, among these wars, remains to be assessed as the cause of nationalism. Balkan nationalism was extremely extreme, aggressive and borderless, thus sowing the seeds

of hatred between different ethnicities, living side by side on the old peninsula, even within the same state. This hatred would even be passed down through the centuries, reaching alive and, often, even more aggravated to the present day. Perhaps, a more extensive analysis can be made of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, in the military plan, where the politics and economy of the Balkan states of those years were also concentrated. If we were to go back and refer to the figures presented in terms of organization, training, completion, equipment and armament of the armies of the warring countries, we would be confronted with facts and often extreme situations. Thus, as one of the most in-depth scholars of Balkan history, M. Glenny, analyzes that several battles pitted forces against each other, each larger than Napoleon's largest army, and this happened at one time "when Serbia, for example, had a population of less than three million (Glenny, 2007). Postponing the analysis, Glenn added: "Bulgarians mobilized as much as 25 percent of the men, up to 500,000 (Glenny, 2007). Such a degree of mobilization in the Balkans of 1912-1913, testified to the high level of militarization and nationalist propaganda, closely intertwined with religious motives, the liberation war against the rule of the Ottoman Empire, ethnological, etc., which had not been seen until then in this region invaded by the armies of several great empires. From the military professional point of view, these wars brought and represented some innovations both in the improved organization in approximation with the Western European models of armies, and in the organization and conduct of some combat operations, implementation of martial arts, especially by the armies of the Balkan Alliance. This was seen not only in the use of numerous military forces, in large-scale theaters and fronts, and in the unprecedented duration of hostilities, ranging from 3-4 to 6-7 months (Hooton, 2014). Efforts were also made and even used in aircraft with reconnaissance and supply missions, but also for bombing, in some cases, albeit to a limited extent. Fortifications were also built and used successfully, even fortified regions, intertwined with numerous engineering obstacles, such as in the Wars of Shkodra, Ioannina, Lozengrad, etc. As part of the war many types of fighting took place, such as in prolonged sieges, with concentrated artillery strikes and raging fire, in certain parts of the front or to explode the powerful almost hermetic defense of the enemy. As Glenny further describes, all of this was made possible for the first time in this region because... technology enabled commanders to conduct combat twenty-four hours a day while the enemy's defenses were illuminated. with floodlights (Glenny, 2007). This phenomenon was even observed in the war in Shkodra, where the Ottoman-Albanian defense forces used electric lights to blind the invading Montenegrin ladders that invaded at night (*History of the Albanian Army 1912-1939, Part one, 2000*). But, these phenomena, characteristics or features were not the only ones in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. There have been others, which have been addressed in this study. Such are what are known as the chapter of the "Last Wars" in the Balkans, which took place in the last ten years of the twentieth century. Those were the wars that took place in the context of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, in the struggle for independence of the constituent states of this Federation such as Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and, finally, Kosovo (Bregu 2016). The last century left many scars of numerous wars on the Old Peninsula. As a Balkan analyst and political scientist writes: A total of seven wars took place in the Balkans

during the twentieth century. The First and Second Balkan Wars, the First World War, the Greco-Turkish War, the Second World War, the Civil War in Greece and a series of wars in the remaining Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Kadare I., Simiç P., Frckskoski L., Hysa Y., 2012). At their epicenter, according to this author, the most common motive were unresolved national issues, aiming at the creation of nation-states, i.e. homogeneous ethnic states that extend throughout the ethnic territory of a nation (Kadare I., Simiç P., Frckskoski L., Hysa Y., 2012). In conclusion it can be said that these wars were essentially undertaken in the name of peace and security, but brought only insecurity, occupation, instability, hatred and again endless conflicts, as they deviated from the mission and strategic goal of liberating the peninsula from the Ottoman invaders. Something else, peace, understanding, good neighborliness and agreements are the best tools to achieve security and stability. Even Napoleon Bonaparte, known as the "Emperor of War", in the War-Peace report praised Peace, saying: War is an anachronism. There will come a day when victories will be reaped without balls and bayonets (Ludvig, 1999).

References

- Ludvig E. (1999). *Napoleon*. Tirana: Globus R. (Back cover).
- Tolstoy L. (2003). *War and Peace*. Tirana: OMSCA-1.
- Canaj Z. (1984). *Serbian Social Democracy and the Albanian Question*. Prishtina: Instituti Albanologjik.
- Castellan G. (1991). *History of Balkans*. (Translation), Tirana: ÇABEJ.
- Bregu E. (2016). *Wars and security in the Balkans* (Dissertation). National Library.
- Glenny M. (2007). *History of Balkans 1804-1999*. Tirana: Toena dhe IDK.
- Hall Richard C. (2000). *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913, Prelude to the First World War*. Publisher: Routledge.
- Hooton E. R. (2014). *Prelude to The First World War, The Balkan Wars 1912-1913*, U.S.A: Fonthill Media Limited.
- Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (1914). Published by: The Endowment Washington DC.
- Ivetic E. (2008). *Balkan Wars*. Tirana: Dituria.
- Teodorova M. (2004). *Imaginary Balkans*. Tirana: Institute of Dialogue and Communication.
- Kadare I., Simiç P., Frckskoski L., Hysa Y. (2012). *The South of Balkans* (Translation). Tirana: Onufri.
- Malcolm N. (2001). *Kosovo a short history*. (Translation). Tiranë: Koha Ditore and Shtëpia e Librit.
- Mazower M. (2003). *Balkan a short history* Tirana: Skanderbeg books.
- History of the Albanian Army 1912-1939, Part one* (2000). Tiranë: SHBU.
- Rexhepi P. (2001). *The defense of Shkodra*. Tirana: Globus R.
- Scatula E. (1913). *Valka na Balkane: Valecne tazeni Bulharska, Srbska, Recka a Cerne Hory proti Turecku*. Praha.
- Other Balkan Wars* (1993). Tirana: Onufri.